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Abstract  
On the basis of the “challenge” North [1997 (1977)] identified in the works of Polanyi, we 
propose to outline the originality of North‟s institutionalism, especially in comparison with 
“new  institutionalism”  in  economics  as  well  as  in  sociology.  Far  from  endorsing  the 
dichotomy between market and non market dimensions of economic activities at the basis of 
the analyses of Williamson and Granovetter, North‟s definition of institutions as “rules of the 
game” allows him to conceive of institutions as the institutional foundations of the market and 
therefore as explanatory principles of historical dynamics. 
 








































1Beyond the market-institutions dichotomy: 
the institutionalism of Douglass C. North 





The relationship between institutions and the market is one of the key objects of what 
is  known  today  as  “new  institutionalism”
1, both in economics, with “new institutional 
economics” and in sociology, mainly with economic sociology
2. Those who embrace new 
institutionalism  commonly  observe  that  “institutions  matter”  as  variables  explaining 
economic performance. However, the market, seen as a self-regulated adjustment mechanism 
of  supply  and  demand,  remains  the  usual  reference  to  conceive  of  economic  activity. 
Institutions are then defined negatively in contrast to the market, as social regulations limiting 
economic agents‟ scope for action. 
But isn‟t such a conception of institutions as constraints weighing on the market from 
the outside too simplistic? It seems to give credit to the existence of a market sphere taken as 
given, alongside the community or the hierarchical organization. By analyzing the “instituted 
process” leading to a market society, Polanyi brings to light the historicity of the economic 
categories of the market. Polanyi‟s “challenge” according to North (1977) requires reflecting 
on the very existence of a market sphere by studying the historical dynamics explaining its 
emergence. We aim to underline the relevance of North‟s answer to this challenge through his 
renewed conception of institutions in his pioneering thought in the early 1990s. It differs in 
particular from that of “new institutionalists” who posit dichotomously that institutions are a 
sphere external to the market, which naturalizes market mechanisms. 
By conceiving of institutions as “the rules of the game”, providing a framework for 
economic activities, North‟s analysis implies taking into account the institutional foundations 
of the market. By avoiding both economic sociology‟s fascination with informal norms and 
networks, and the focus of organizational economics on contracts and organizational forms, 
this analysis calls into question the usual dichotomy between institutions and the market. 
In order to show the originality of North‟s contribution and to understand how he has 
answered Polanyi‟s challenge, we shall first discuss Polanyi‟s analysis of the emergence of a 
market society. The challenge is to identify explanatory mechanisms leading from community 
societies  to  market  societies.  We  shall  then  see  how  “new  institutionalism”  ignores  this 
challenge by sticking to the coexistence of two spheres, market and non-market, in economic 
activities, the latter referring to “social structures” in which the economy is “embedded”. We 
shall finally discuss North‟s works to show how they lead to a refoundation of institutionalism 
                                                 
1 Cf. for example the summary presented by Williamson (2000). 
2 Cf. Nee (2003) and his integration of economic sociology in the general approach he 








































1based on a conception of institutions as explanatory factors of historical dynamics by going 
beyond the opposition between market and non market dimensions of the economy. 
1. The market as the outcome of a complex historical process 
In The Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi sheds light on the 19
th century genesis of 
an impossible “market society”, through a historical process initially supported by social and 
political  institutions.  Paradoxically,  institutions  organize  the  operation  of  the  market 
conceived of as outside any political influence. Polanyi‟s analyses are however limited by 
their difficulty to conceive of institutions, in market societies, other than as devices creating 
an artificial scarcity that pushes agents to seek monetary gain as the main motive of their 
activity. 
The historical emergence of the market 
One of Polanyi‟s main objectives is to call into question the economists‟ view that the 
existence  of  price-creating  markets  is  natural.  To  do  so,  he  first  presents  the  main 
characteristics  of  traditional  societies  that  preceded  this  situation  of  market  hegemony. 
Traditional society was characterized by a strong communitarian dimension, as evidenced by 
the principles of reciprocity in gifts and redistribution of subsistence to the needy (Polanyi 
1971 [1944], p.47 et seq.). Redistribution is undertaken on the basis of an initial centralization 
of resources carried out through “indirect” transactions which are radically different from 
market transactions. In this context, there were markets on the margins of social activity in the 
form of transactions on surpluses with other communities (ibid., p. 57 et s.). 
According to Polanyi, the existence of societies dominated by the market is a historical 
phenomenon which requires conceiving of the categories of the market as historical products. 
North (1977) considers this to be one of the main contributions of Polanyi and to constitute a 
challenge for the “New economic history” – even if North is one of its founders – which tends 
to focus on multi-secular econometric regressions without pondering upon the significance of 
these categories for the actors at the different epochs studied
3. 
In The Great Transformation, Polanyi identifies three factors that explain the passage 
from traditional society to market society: the affirmation of the state, mechanization and the 
recognition of social mechanisms beyond the control of the state that reveal the existence of 
“civil society”. 
The affirmation of the state allowed, through continental mercantilism, the extension 
of the scope of economic activities from the local to the national level. Paradoxically, this 
affirmation of the state involved considerable regulation of productive activities with regard 
to products as well as working conditions. Economic activity tended to take the form of “One 
Big Market” (p. 72), so that “internal trade in Western Europe was created by the intervention 
of the state” (p. 63). 
In  the  transformations  that  came  about,  “the  invention  of  elaborate  and  therefore 
specific machinery” (p. 74) gave rise to a new relation between the tradesman and production. 
In a way, investments forced producers to sell, putting tradesmen in a central position to 
ensure  the  sale  of  their  products.  Activity  directed  towards  monetary  gain  predominated 
progressively. 
Gradually, the extension of markets, relative to goods as well as to labor and means of 
subsistence, led to the experience of a “palpable interdependence” (Polanyi 2007) between the 
                                                 
3  This criticism of quantitativism in history finds an echo in the works of Robert 
Salais and Alain Desrosières on the historicity of statistical categories and in the debate 








































1prices formed on these markets. According to Polanyi, this was a “discovery – one of the most 
decisive emotional and intellectual experiences in the constitution of the modern world  – 
which was for the physiocrats an illumination which transformed them into a philosophical 
sect”. The discovery of social dynamics in the form of the division of labor (Smith), or even 
“civil society” (Hegel), led to conceiving the reconciliation between personal interest and 
public  interest  outside  of  any  state  intervention.  This  heralded  what  Polanyi  calls  an 
“institutional pattern”
4 within which “a self-regulated market demands nothing less than the 
institutional separation of society into an economic and political sphere” (p. 71). 
The commodification of labor as the anchoring of the market in the concrete social world 
The  general  dynamics  of  the  “commodification  of  the  world”  (Sobel  2007)  that 
Polanyi describes corresponds to a reversal of embeddedness: “instead of the economy being 
embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system” (p. 57). 
At the macro-social level, this reversal of embeddedness gave rise to an “avalanche of social 
dislocation” (p. 40) and “the transformation implies a change in the motive of action on the 
part of the members of society: for the motive of subsistence that of gain must be substituted” 
(p.  41).  This  change  occurred  through  the  commodification  of  land,  labor  and  money, 
described as “fictitious commodities”. 
Polanyi  analyses  first  the  commodification  of  land.  It  took  place  in  Great  Britain 
through the enclosure movement, which plunged landless peasants into extreme poverty. In 
this process, Polanyi emphasizes the initiative of the Parliament in enforcing the enclosures 
and the Crown‟s responses to limit the movement. He goes on to discuss the commodification 
of  money  through  the  institution  of  the  gold  standard  and  the  doctrine  of  exchange  rate 
stability.  But  he  concentrates  above  all  on  the  commodification  of  labor  that  drastically 
altered the existence of individuals. The essential point of his argument focuses on a specific 
intervention of the state: the creation, in 1795 by magistrates in Speenhamland, of a scale of 
wage supplements instituting a minimum income “assured to the poor irrespective of their 
earnings” (p. 78, italics in the original). 
This income guarantee, which lasted from 1795 until the abolition of the scale in 1834, 
was an obstacle to the commodification of labor. This scale can thus be seen as a temporary 
suspension of the market mechanism. The role of  the state was ambiguous: it introduced 
redistributive systems alleviating the effects of the market for it to be better accepted. Once 
the market principle was established, this type of regulation was overthrown and the action of 
the state was narrowed down to the “invisible” administration of the market through the law 
(property rights, contracts). Trade unionism and unemployment compensation can similarly 
be  seen  as  specific  measures  compensating  the  commodification  of  labor  to  actually 
strengthen the “self-regulation” (p. 77) of the market. 
Polanyi beyond Polanyi 
Polanyi‟s analyses underscore the social dislocations that accompanied the emergence 
of “market societies” based on the pioneering experience of Great Britain. In his conclusion 
however, Polanyi (1971) pushes his analysis further. He envisages dynamics of freedom that 
are not reduced to an “atomization”, but rather refers to “these high values inherited from the 
market economy” and “the most precious traditions of Renaissance and Reformation” (p. 
255). What is at stake here is to go beyond the hegemony of the market, the “economic 
sophism” (Polanyi 2007), to rediscover the true scope of these values which, hidden by the 
market, were trampled by totalitarian regimes. 
                                                 








































1One  would  probably  have  to  be  more  “Polanyian”  than  Polanyi  himself  to  reach 
beyond the rejection of instrumental rationality implied by his denunciation of the hegemony 
of the “market” and to assume that liberty is a core value of social activity (Postel and Sobel 
2008). The conception of a democratic policy of liberty, which is only suggested in The Great 
Transformation,  is  to  be  found  in  the  rest  of  his  writings,  elaborated  in  reference  to  the 
various  historical  contexts  he  lived  in  (Maucourant  2007).  For  example,  his  idea  of  a 
“functional  democracy”  (Polanyi  2008)  seems  inspired  by  the  model  of  the  Viennese 
municipality of the 1930s which sought to combine associative democracy and social learning 
(Mendell 2003). Polanyi‟s thought therefore pleads for the recognition of the consequences of 
public action in economic activities so that liberty does not turn out to be a mechanism of 
social dislocation. But it is necessary to go beyond the liberal negation of the state and of 
institutions to conceive of their effective role in society and in the economy. 
2. Organization and embeddedness: the two faces of the dichotomy between market and 
institutions 
Polanyi‟s analyses describe a process where the market is “disembedded” from society 
which leads to a major crisis and to the challenge to democracy that was fascism in the 1930s. 
According to the most astute commentators of “new institutionalism” (such as Nee (2005)), 
Polanyi‟s political diagnosis is of secondary importance. The crisis he analyzes is only a sign 
of the limits of “disembeddedness” and a proof, a contrario, of the ongoing embeddedness of 
economic activities as investigated by economic sociology following Granovetter, or of the 
existence  of  “governance  structures”  alternative  to  the  market  in  the  perspective  of 
Williamson. The institutional dimension in these studies seems to be the identification of a 
plurality  of  coordination  “structures”,  masked  by  neo-classical  economics‟  focus  on  the 
working of the market
5. We shall first discuss transaction costs, the common starting point of 
these analyses which are not opposed to the neo -classical approach of the market and only 
suggest  to  enrich  them.  Then  we  shall   evoke  the  plurality  of  “governance  structures” 
presented by Williamson, and the dynamics of networks and of strong and weak ties analyzes 
by Granovetter. 
Transaction costs as the building block of “new institutionalism” 
To account for the diversity of economic situations, the notion of “transaction costs”
6 
makes it possible to bring the various phenomena of transactions back to a single scale. On 
this basis, it is possible to identify social gains in situations where a hierarchical model of 
organization is dominant as well as in those where interpersonal relationships are dominant. 
In both cases, conditions can be identified under which a governance structure different from 
the market is more efficient in terms of transaction costs (Nee 2005, p. 53). 
Indeed, contrary to the common knowledge of orthodox theory, market transactions do 
not always lead to greater economic efficiency, because they are constantly threatened by the 
                                                 
5 The  recurring  concept  of  “structure”  in  new  economic  sociology,  following  the 
analysis of the market as a “social structure” by White (1981) and following the works of 
Williamson, raises the question whether “new institutionalism” is not in a large part a “new 
structuralism”. This “new structuralism” can be identified for example in the sociology of 
networks,  networks  being  considered  as  “structures”  constraining  individual  behavior 
(Lazéga, Mounier and Snijders (2008)). 








































1lack of loyalty of individuals who are tempted by an opportunistic behavior due to the form of 
rationality  that  is  posited.  According  to  Williamson  (1975,  1985),  the  main  sources  of 
transaction costs are indeed uncertainty and asset specificity which give rise to temptations of 
“opportunistism”,  which  is  “self-interest  seeking  with  guile”  (Williamson  1985,  p. 70). 
Opportunism gives rise to bilateral dependence (called “hold up” in the incomplete contract 
theory) and explains the need for organizations and therefore authority. 
Orthodox theory is not invalidated but rather enriched by taking into account new 
assumptions on the cost and asymmetry of information, the cost of fulfilling commitments, 
etc. Williamson (1985, p. 20-21) distinguishes between ex ante and ex post transaction costs. 
Ex  ante  transactions  costs  are  “the  costs  of  drafting,  negotiating,  and  safeguarding  an 
agreement”.  “Ex  post  costs  of  contracting  take  several  forms.  These  include  (1)  the 
maladaptation costs incurred when transactions drift out of alignment […], (2) the costs of 
haggling incurred if bilateral efforts are made to correct ex post misalignments, (3) the setup 
and running costs associated with the governance structures (often not the courts) to which 
disputes are referred, and (4) the bonding costs of effecting secure commitments”. 
Transaction costs correspond to the fact that every exchange presupposes the existence 
of the necessary physical and institutional equipment, which inevitably leads to a gap between 
real prices and the equilibrium prices that would have resulted from the operation of a “pure” 
market. 
Hierarchical organizations and  market transactions 
In the face of these sources of transaction costs, the choice of various governance 
structures
7 alternative to the market, in particular the hierarchical organization, reduces the 
temptations to deceive thanks to the incentive structure they impose on agents and the 
contractual protections they confer upon them (particularly the threat  of enforcement by the 
law, courts and the police). Williamson identifies a whole range of  governance structures, 
from large integrated firms to market transactions with various hybrid forms in between. They 
bring graduated responses according to the frequ ency of the transactions and the degree of 
asset specificity. 
 Vertical  integration  is  the  most  radical  way  of  eliminating  opportunism,  in  the 
presence of highly specific assets and very frequent transactions thanks to the replacement of 
coordination by prices by coordination by authority. Williamson is nevertheless aware of the 
costs of hierarchical organization linked to weakened incentives compared with market 
transactions and to the operating costs of a bureaucracy, costs which leave room for market 
transactions alongside large integrated firms. 
According to Williamson, institutions are governance structures of transactions. The 
market is one of them but Williamson is more interested in organizations (vertical integration) 
as a hierarchical monocracy sub mitted to formal rules defined in opposition to the market 
sphere. This entails that organizations are assimilated to institutions distinct from the market, 
which leads to a naturalization of the market: it is the  inevitable  reference of economic 
efficiency and organizations are supposed to obtain the same results as a market that would 
not be plagued by opportunism. 
Identifying a plurality of governance structures therefore does not aim to shed light on 
the dynamics  of  emergence  of  a  market  society  that  we   observed  in  Polanyi‟s  works. 
Williamson‟s approach is more akin to a perspective of trade-off between these governance 
                                                 
7 “By  governance  structure  I  have  reference  to  the  explicit  or  implicit  contractual 
framework within which a transaction is located (markets, firms, and mixed modes – e.g. 








































1structures to optimize economic performance at the micro-economic decision level. To the 
extent that transaction costs result mainly from agents‟ opportunism, interpersonal links are 
suspected of masking situations of conflicting interests. 
The communitarian structuralism of Mark Granovetter 
In the face of this initial wariness of new institutional economics towards personal 
ties, Granovetter (2005, p. 38) suggests that these ties may also have beneficial effects, thus 
making room for sociological investigation alongside economic theory:
8 “To understand how 
deviations  from  competitive  equilibrium  price  may  occur  requires  analysis  of  both  the 
economics and the sociology of the situation” (ibid.). 
Granovetter‟s study of the sociological dimension of transaction costs refers to his 
perception of the sustained embeddedness of economic activities, a term that he uses in direct 
reference to the “disembeddeness” he perceived in Polanyi‟s analysis(1971 [1944]). Indeed, 
he argues that it is necessary to accept the permanent role of family, territorial and ethnic 
groups in economic activities. To identify this communitarian dimension, Granovetter relies 
on revealing the existence of “networks” that are frequently hidden by the agents.  In his 
opinion,  these  networks  constitute  the  fundamental  communitarian  structure,  seen  as  a 
refutation of the existence of Marxist social classes: 
“Karl Marx asserted […] that family and friendship ties would be fully subordinated 
under modern capitalism to the “cash nexus”. But despite intimate connections between social 
networks and the modern economy, the two have not merged or become identical. Indeed, 
norms often develop that limit the merger of sectors” (Granovetter 2005, p. 36). 
This conception of embeddedness leads to naturalize the communautarian dimension 
of all social activities, in the same way that orthodox economic theory and common Marxism 
naturalize  the  market  and  the  economy.  It  is  fundamentally  different  from  Polanyi‟s 
conception,  where  embeddedness  is  only  considered  at  a  global  level  and  concerns  the 
relationship  between  the  economic  and  the  social,  without  assimilating  the  social  to  the 
“communitarian”
9. Thus, disembeddedness according to Polanyi does not refer to the loss of 
communitarian and social links which characterizes, for example, Castel‟s “desaffiliation” 
(1995); rather, it concerns a deep social mutation akin to the passage from mechanic solidarity 
to  organic  solidarity  in  The  social  division  of  labor  of  Durkheim,  which  leads  to  a 
embeddedness of the economic in individuals‟ motivations. 
Entrepreneurs as heroic opportunists 
According to  Granovetter, the ongoing development  of economic activities can be 
explained by the existence of “strong ties” resulting from communitarian links, but also by the 
                                                 
8  North  (1977)  already  suggested  the  possible  explanation  of  reciprocity  in 
transactions mentioned by Polanyi in terms of reducing transaction costs, but it was in 
comparison with a syste m where jurisdictions enforce contracts. Reciprocity is seen as a 
general principle aiming to guarantee transactions in the absence of any court system to 
enforce contracts. Granovetter focuses only on social control in close -knit groups, ignoring 
the effects of general principles and institutions on transaction costs.  
9 As suggested by Caillé (1995), the concept of embeddedness is torn between a 









































1existence of “weak ties” established by exceptional individuals, able to break free from the 
hold  of  the  community  and  its  norms  (Granovetter  1973).  Indeed,  by  considering 
embeddedness as the communitarian basis of economic activities, it is necessary to resort to 
the actions of exceptional individuals to explain their dynamics. Thus, while strong ties are 
economically  advantageous,  so  too  are  weak  ties.  This  is  illustrated  by  the  success  of 
individuals  who  discover  new  opportunities  that  arise  when  relationships  are  established 
between initially unconnected resources and networks, which usually implies taking liberties 
with the norms and values of their group. According to Granovetter, such individuals can be 
described as “entrepreneurs” in the sense of Joseph Schumpeter or Fredrik Barth (ibid., p. 46). 
These “entrepreneurs”, through their ability to abstract from usual social norms and rules 
which is not dissimilar to following a purely instrumental rationality
10 leaving aside ethical 
principles
11, thus have much in common with Williamson‟s “opportunists”. 
Weak ties thus refer to the ability of some exceptional individuals to cut loose from 
the “over-socialized” world of the strong ties of the community. But in this approach, the 
dynamics  of  economic  activity  are  fundamentally  indeterminated  as  they  are  explained 
sometimes  by  strong  ties  and  sometimes  by  weak  ties.  Furthermore,  this  constant  switch 
evokes the tension between economic analysis reduced to the study of the behavior of rational 
agents  and  sociological  analysis  reduced  to  the  study  of  socially  constrained  behavior. 
Williamson (2000) thus goes so far as to consider new institutionalism as a superposition of 
levels. The analysis endogenizes a growing set of “institutional” variables: the level of the 
market as the fundamental level of allocation and employment of resources is supplemented 
by that of governance structures, then that of the institutional environment (formal rules) and 
finally the level of embeddedness, defined as informal institutions linked to networks and 
small groups. This results, as shown by Orléan (2007), in a sort of social division of labor 
between economics and sociology where standard economics defines the range of possible 
evolutions on the basis of the choices of rational agents, whereas sociology focuses on the 
analysis of the reproduction of communitarian structures. 
3. Institutions, organizations and economic performance in history 
In  the  approaches  of  Williamson  and  Granovetter,  the  debates  are  focused  on  the 
margins  of  the  market  and  this  prevents  apprehending  the  institutional  dimension  of  the 
contract  and  tends  to  naturalize  the  operation  of  the  market.  Moreover,  by  defining 
institutions as organizational forms and informal norms, the authors introduce considerable 
semantic confusion between “institutions” and “organizations” and leave aside an actor – the 
state – whose role is essential both in creating and enforcing institutions. By proposing a clear 
definition of institutions and considering them within complex historical dynamics, North 
aims to find a way out of this dichotomy between market and non-market dimensions to 
apprehend institutional dynamics explaining the emergence of the market. 
Institutions 
The definition of institutions in North‟s works has evolved and we identify a decisive 
turning  point  in  1990-91.  In  1984,  he  defines  institutions  as  “a  series  of  constraints  on 
                                                 
10 They do this by eliminating from rationality all principles hindering their projects, 
which leads them astray from the “axiologic rationality” identified by Boudon (1999) as the 
most common one among social actors. 
11 This conception of the entrepreneur is radically different from that found in Weber‟s 








































1behavior taking the form of principles and regulations” (North 1984 p. 8). Institutions are 
associated to individual behavior as constraints. This conception of institutions is close to the 
“deontic” conception according to which the rule of law is considered as a “rule of behavior” 
(Jeammaud 1990, p. 199). 
In the definition North proposes in 1990, the constraint is not exercised on the same 
object.  According  to  him,  “institutions  are  “the  rules  of  the  game  in  a  society  or,  more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence, 
they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic” (North 
1990, p. 3). They no longer constrain individual behavior but their interaction
12. This wider 
definition of institutions leads the way out of a  deontic conception to envisage the structures 
of the interactions, that is the framework of reference
13 agents rely on to define, organize and 
evaluate their relations with each other. The contract can then be considered as an institution 
to the extent that it is defined in relation to contract law which is not itself contractual. As 
wrote Durkheim, “all is not contractual in the contract” (1930). 
North‟s analyses also depart from the conception of the law in the Law and economics 
approach  as  developed  for  example  by  judge  Posner.  As  pointed  out  by  Lazéga  (2009), 
Posner‟s initial analyses conferred a central role to the economic maximization of utility in 
the resolution of disputes submitted to the judge. Even if Posner later on also recognized the 
role of a “„softer‟ pragmatism” (Lazéga 2009, p. 207), he still gives prime of place to a form 
of  “charismatic”  justice,  based  on  the  judge‟s  sense  of  equity,  in  contradiction  with  the 
institutional reality of the existence of the rule of law. Thus, institutions as references for 
actions tend to be subsumed, in Posner‟s analyses, in the judge‟s common sense. On the 
contrary,  in  North‟s  view,  institutions  are  an  essential  basis  in  the  ordering  of  social 
relationships and in the resolution of disputes that arise. They are conceived as a motive of 
action  for  individuals  and  organizations,  whose  effects  cannot  be  understood  outside  the 
framework  of  their  social  actions.  North‟s  conception  of  institutions  is  thus  akin  to  the 
“empirical point of view on the law” as a motive of action of agents in weberian sociology 
(Didry 2006). 
 
Organizations and institutional change 
In  North‟s  perspective,  markets  as  “price-creating  mechanisms”  as  considered  by 
Polanyi can only be apprehended through the mobilization of institutions such as property 
rights, contracts and money, in the context of the rule of law which guarantees to contractants 
the  possibility  to  appeal  to  common  law  jurisdictions  in  case  of  disputes.  In  contrast, 
Williamson  equated  institutions  and  governance  structures,  which  implies  opposing  the 
market as a decentralized institution to the organization as a hierarchical institution. 
North refuses to assimilate institutions and organizations and to oppose institutions 
and the market. Institutions are, according to him, the rules of the game, and organizations are 
the teams of players (North 1994, p. 361). The organization is a group of individuals sharing a 
collective goal which belongs to the set of opportunities defined by institutions. It is often 
related to an “entrepreneur”, in charge of representing its interests
14. It exists in numerous 
                                                 
12 This is in opposition to the structuralist scheme which highlights the constraining 
action of social structures on individuals. 
13 Jeammaud (1990) suggests to call them “models” for action. 









































1spheres, including political, social, educational and economic organizations, which, for North, 
include not only firms but also trade unions, cooperatives, etc. 
Having  thus  distinguished  organizations  from  institutions,  North  conceives  of  an 
incremental  process  of  institutional  and  economic  change  resulting  from  the  interaction 
between organizations  and institutions.  Individuals  and organizations  are characterized by 
their learning ability
15 that enables them to discover new opportunities for action in a given 
institutional environment, which they help to change through their actions. This learning 
process  took  on  a  collective  dimension  in  the  case  of  medieval  Western  economic 
organizations, with the involvement of merchants and market organizations in institutional 
dynamics. 
The  “institutional”  learning  process  of  organizations  takes  place  within  the  set  of 
possible  interactions  between  organizations  and  institutions,  what  North  calls  “the 
institutional matrix”: 
“The  institutional  matrix  consists  of  an  interdependent  web  of  institutions  and 
consequent political and economic organizations that are characterized by massive increasing 
returns. […] Network externalities arise because of the initial setup costs (like the de novo 
creation of the U.S. Constitution in 1787), the learning effects described above, coordination 
effects  via  contracts  with  other  organizations,  and  adaptive  expectations  arising  from  the 
prevalence of contracting based on the existing institutions.” (North 1991, p. 109). 
Institutional  change  driven  by  organizational  learning  is  constrained  by  the 
interdependencies in this matrix. This explains that the result may be partly unintentional, 
even if institutional change concerns a multitude of individuals and organizations pursuing 
intentional goals. 
Institutional change is not reducible to a trade off between governance structures. It 
embodies specific historical dynamics which affect the entire set of economic activities and 
determines what North calls the “economic performance” of a society. The problem is no 
longer to seek economic efficiency while supposing the existence of a unique and identifiable 
model  of  development;  it  is  to  explain  specific  social  trajectories  defined  by  economic 
activities  embedded  in  institutional  matrixes  themselves  in  evolution.  Furthermore, 
institutions are not only external to organizations: as collective groups, organizations rely on 
interactions framed by institutions as in the case of the wage-earning worker whose condition 
is inseparable from the labor contract as defined by common law. North thus finds a way out 
of the dichotomy between the market and non-market dimensions of the economy as his 
analysis  relies  on  other  categories:  institutions  vs.  organizations,  formal  vs.  informal 
institutions, the hierarchy of formal rules between constitutions, laws and contracts (cf. North 
1990 p. 47). 
The active role of the state through the creation and enforcement of institutions 
The  institutional  dynamics  North  identifies  are  based  on  an  organization  that  is 
assigned a central position beyond its traditional allocative, redistributive and stabilization 
roles: the state. Indeed, the state plays an essential role in the creation and enforcement of 
institutions. This latter role is documented, in particular, for an institution that economists 
have naturalized in their analysis of the market: the contract. In the perspective of the German 
historical school, North (1990) underscores the relationship between the emergence of the 
state and the extension of trade, with the search for an institutional framework allowing to 
                                                 
15 This learning is relative to markets and institutions as well as to the productive 








































1“depersonalize” trade. In this search, “more resources must be devoted to measurement and 
enforcement” (North 1991, p. 99). 
In addition to the enforcement of institutions provided by the state because it has a 
monopoly  on  the  legitimate  use  of  physical  force,  its  members  contribute  to  producing 
institutions. North suggests to apprehend representative democracy as providing a framework 
for debates between groups of different natures, constituted on the basis of economic interests 
but also of “ideas” or “values” in the case of the abolition of slavery (North 1990, p. 85). 
These  groups  send  representatives  to  the  Congress,  who  have  to  compromise  with  the 
representatives of other interests which may be different or even contradictory, in order to 
arrive at a majority vote to pass a law. The role of organizations in legislative activities thus 
further enriches the analysis of the interactions between institutions and organizations within 
the institutional matrix. We can identify a process of action-retroaction with on the one hand 
the influence of organizations on the institutional framework and on the other hand the way 
organizations learn to adapt to this institutional framework
16. 
As the enforcer and the central producer of institutions, the state plays an essential role 
in the incremental historical processes identified by North. Thus, North proposes a study of 
the gradual institutionalisation of commercial exchange by the state in the Western world, 
adopting a point of view symmetrical to that of Polanyi on the role of the state. Indeed, the 
state instituted a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force which ruled out violence in 
interactions and joined the efforts of merchants to protect their goods. For North as for 
Polanyi, the way the British Parliament gained supremacy the over the Crown after The 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 illustrates a decisive mechanism in this process.  
By  emphasizing  the  institutional  construction  of  the  framework  of  commercial 
exchange, North‟s analyses lead to a critical perspective on recent “liberal” reforms that aim 
to  institutionalize  the  market  only  by  calling  existing  regulations  into  question.  The 
experience of the post-socialist transition in the 1990s is especially enlightening in this regard. 
The first recommendations addressed by the World Bank and the IMF to the governments of 
former socialist countries concerning how the transition should be conducted underscored 
especially the importance of a withdrawal of the state from the economy. The “Washington 
consensus”
17 recommended liberalizing markets, deregulating the economy and privatizing 
assets to enable a free, and therefore necessarily efficient, market to emerge. This approach 
insisted far more on the destruction of the socialist institutional framework than on building a 
capitalist one, which was supposed to emerge by itself. The experience of the early transition 
years led, however, to the emergence of particularly inefficient institutional dynamics (Cf. 
World Bank 2002, and Koleva and Vincensini 2000 on the case of the Czech Republic), 
resulting in the former Soviet Union in powerful lobbies capturing both the market and the 
state (Frydman et al. 1998). It was not until the second half of the 1990s that international 
financial institutions became more sensitive to the need to build the institutional equipment of 
                                                 
16 On the learning of the scope of the institution of trade unions in France, as from the 
Act of 1884, leading to the elaboration of legislation on  collective conventions, see Didry 
(2002). 
17 This term designates the consensual position of the World Bank and the IMF 








































1markets,  referring  explicitly  to  North  (World  Bank  2002)
18. Their recommendations then 
shifted to regulating relationships between economic actors, re-institutionalizing the economy 
and especially rebuilding the state (Bruszt 2002), whose central role in creating and enforcing 
the institutional framework was finally recognized. 
Three institutional worlds 
Refusing to attribute the Western world‟s economic performance to a sort of cultural 
superiority, North (1990, 1994) identifies a variety of “institutional matrixes”
19 for which we 
suggest to speak of “worlds” in the sense that they correspond to processes reinforced by the 
activity of individuals, according to specific path dependent trajectories
20. 
The Anglo-saxon world (Great Britain, United States) is defined by the pre-eminence 
of  the  Parliament,  the  guarantee  of  property  rights  and  the  openness  of  institutions  – 
particularly legal ones, i.e. laws and jurisdictions – to the influence of organizations. Within a 
lasting institutional matrix, representative democracy is linked here to political and economic 
organizations that draw capabilities for action from institutions and, in return, accumulate 
knowledge from their experience of these institutions that leads them to introduce legal and 
jurisprudential adjustments. 
In  this  regard,  North‟s  analyses  evoke  the  process  of  formal  “rationalization”  that 
Weber (1986) identified in the development of Western law (Coutu 1995). Organizations, 
particularly economic organizations, act within it like what Weber calls the “forces of the 
market”  in  an  “interdependent  network”  of  formal  rules  and  a  hierarchical  system  of 
jurisdictions. 
The world of the Souk
21 is defined by the talent of the merchants as well as their 
individual qualifications and their ability to monopolize information on products so as to raise 
the transaction costs of their co-contractants. The Souk escapes almost entirely from state 
control and disputes are settled internally by resorting to direct testimony on the actions of 
individuals within a framework evoking what Weber (1986) calls “Cadi justice”. The Cadi 
“invents” his decision without referring to prior rules. In other words, “regulation of disputes 
involves testimony by reliable witnesses to factual matters, not the weighting of competing, 
juridical  principles”  (North  1991,  p.  103).  In  this  institutional  world,  learning  remains 
individual and it is not communicated to institutions, which remain on the whole informal. 
A third institutional model can be found in the history of Spain in the form of the 
world of state majesty. In this world, the state imposes a common religion and endows itself 
with a bureaucracy capable of overseeing in detail the functioning of the various spheres of 
activity.  Individuals  and  organizations  other  than  the  sovereign  are  deprived  of  any 
institutional voice. 
                                                 
18 However, North (2005) criticizes the approach of the World Bank, which preserves 
an  optimizing  approach  and  claims  to  know  the  set  of  “good”  institutions  to  implement, 
whereas North emphasizes how difficult it is to conceive of and create efficient institutions. 
19 Baechler (2009) speaks of “cultural matrixes” to qualify the dynamic plurality of 
human societies. 
20 This is similar to the identification of a plurality of worlds of the law in Weber‟s 
sociology of law by Didry (2006). 








































1The identification of these three worlds refers to consolidation processes that define 
specific  “institutional  trajectories”  (Vincensini  2010).  It  raises  the  question  of  a  possible 
convergence  between  different  institutional  configurations:  to  what  extent  are  the  other 
institutional worlds required and able to align themselves with the one identified as leading to 
the best economic performance? This alignment was sought frequently throughout history, 
such as in the case of South American countries aligning themselves with the model of the 
United  States  after  their  independence.  But  although  it  is  possible  to  import  formal 
institutions, it is almost impossible to deliberately transform existing informal institutions. 
Any  institutional  transfer  will  therefore  be  necessarily  incomplete,  insofar  as  it  does  not 
affect, at least in the beginning, informal institutions such as beliefs and cultural norms. It also 
remains threatened by the backlash of informal institutions. As a result, the transfer of more 
or less identical institutions to Central Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union 
had divergent effects –more efficient in Central Europe than in the CIS – due to the difference 
between their underlying informal institutions (Chavance 2008). Similarly, specific national 
institutional  trajectories  persist in  Central  Europe, qualifying the scope  of the thesis  of  a 
convergence with  EU  countries,  particularly  because institutional  change is  not  prompted 
solely by the quest for efficiency but by a set of far more complex processes (cf. Vincensini 
2010). 
Towards a new research program in social sciences? 
Based  on  a  clear  definition  of  institutions  as  rules  of  the  game,  North‟s  analyses 
provide an important contribution to the explanation of complex historical processes which 
comprise  economic  dynamics.  Institutions  are  references  for  the  actors  and  lead  to 
institutional  learning  which  allows  to  explore  the  scope  of  institutions  and  sometimes  to 
suggest improvements. 
In their juridical dimension, institutions also lead to reconsidering the role of the state 
in  economic  and  social  life.  First,  we  can  no  longer  oppose  the  market  with  its  pure 
mechanisms and the intervention of the state which would disrupt them. The state, through the 
institutions of the market, is rather a continuous presence defining the categories of economic 
activity, among which principally references and guides for the actors. Second, the state also 
appears as the locus of the resolution of disputes to obtain the enforcement of commitments 
between agents, in the general framework of the available institutional framework. This view 
of  institutions  assumes  the  existence  in  the  background  of  a  judiciary  system  allowing 
individuals  to  seize  a  judge  and  allowing  the  proportionate  use  of  public  force.  These 
elements  sketch  out  the  constitutive  dimensions  of  the  state  which  are  present  through 
institutions. The state represents force and military supremacy which North often evokes. Il is 
also  the  judge  and  his  ability  to  listen  to  requests  addressed  to  him  by  individuals  and 
organizations  to  reach  a  juridically  acceptable  decision.  It  refers  finally  to  the  essential 
mechanisms of production of institutions according to processes more or less transparent and 
reflecting more or less the interests of citizens. 
Complex historical processes, which affect both the institutional matrix and economic 
performance, are thus at play in the most commonplace economic activities. Progressively, 
North elaborates a research program aiming to analyze the explanatory power of institutions 
on economic performance, by subtly transforming the notion of transaction costs, which he 
still uses, albeit in a slightly different sense than its original use. Initially coined in reference 
to a pure market, this notion was first used by authors developing an “efficiency explanation” 
according to which institutional change is only explained by the search by agents for optimal 
institutional frameworks, such as Demsetz (1967). It then becomes, in North‟s perspective, a 
vector of historical comparatism. The scale of transaction costs is non longer evaluated in 








































1which the researcher studied beforehand. This semantic transformation goes hand in hand 
with  the  emergence  of  the  term  “economic  performance”,  which  according  to  us  is  best 
understood as a historical development forming part of the “tableau” of a given epoch, rather 
than just a competition between national systems. 
By identifying the specific dynamics of the institutional matrix, North develops an analysis of 
“complex interactions between beliefs, institutions and other factors which influence change 
such as geography, military techniques and the evolution of competition”. He is thus led to 
consider  a  science  of  the  “human  environment”  going  beyond  the  philosophical  and 
psychological temptation of economics‟ individual utilitarianism. This endeavor is akin to 
Durkheim‟s  project  of  “explaining  social  facts”  through  the  search  for  social  causalities, 
which aims precisely to link individuals‟ activities with a “social milieu” considered as the 
nexus  of  a  complex  causal  interaction  between  social  facts.  This  analysis  leads  to  an 
illustration of the diversity of human societies, in time and in space, recalling Durkheim‟s 
conclusions on history as the science of human diversity in Pedagogical evolution in France. 
This  approach  is  an  invitation  for  both  economics  and  sociology  to  go  beyond 
methodologies assuming a given human nature
22, whether in a utilitarian mode or in forms 
where some altruism is possible but where it is not possible to introduce human historicity. By 
turning  to  the  study  of  “human  historicity”,  North  intends  to  counter  the  influence  of 
cognitive science on certain approaches of economic theory which seek the determinants of 
instrumental rationality in the physiological architecture of the brain, or even in the structure 
of human genes (genome). 
North‟s interest for the institutional matrix also implies going beyond an interactionist 
approach  which  limits  relevant  interactions  to  a  small  set  of  individuals.  This  type  of 
approach, which exists in sociology with the works of Goffman and Becker as well as in 
economics with those of “économie des conventions”, offers a solution to the polarization of 
research objects at the macro and micro levels. But it nevertheless leaves aside the role of 
institutions as references for actors‟ decisions. The notion of “convention” as developed by 
Lewis  (1969)  thus  leads  to  an  analysis  of  interindividual  coordination  on  the  basis  of  a 
common  knowledge  which  emerges  between  interacting  agents,  but  does  not  take  into 
account the effects of conventions on the very course of individual interactions, in particular 
through the evaluations and juridical resources in disputes the agents find in them. As Robert 
Salais (2009) suggests, the conception of institutions is a challenge for the “économie des 
conventions”  which  can  be  explained  by  the  difficulty  to  identify  its  effects  in  ordinary 
economic transactions: “In order to buy bread at the bakery, it is absolutely not necessary to 
draw  upon  the  entire  institutional  arsenal.  This  does  not  diminish  the  crucial  role  of 
institutions but makes it necessary to define them in relation to their modes of presence in the 
interaction”. 
Considering institutions as an evaluative framework and a procedure of appeal which 
may influence, or even call into question, the interaction process leads to taking into account 
that institutions offer agents possibilities to take their distance with the interaction and even 
possibilities  to  influence  the  interaction.  Furthermore,  this  vision  of  institutions  implies 
recognizing the importance of formal institutions alongside informal ones. The role of formal 
institutions as frameworks for social activity – their “effectivity” (Auvergnon 2008) reveals 
the possibility of intentional institutional change, as a change of the rules of the game in a 
universe dominated by organizations and habits (informal regulation). The intentional change 
of the rules of the game thus opens up a new page of history that actors (as “players”) have 
yet to write. 
                                                 









































North gradually broadened his research outlook towards institutions, on the basis of an 
initial interest in orthodox economic history
23. This increasing openness goes back at least to 
the discovery of the works of Polanyi in the 1970s. The first stage of this broadening led him 
to  question  the  universality  of  economic  categories  and  to  investigate  their  historicity. 
Polanyi‟s  “challenge”  underscores  the  observation  of  the  diversity  of  forms  of  economic 
organization on the basis of the results of ethnology. But according to North, Polanyi‟s use of 
ethnology prevents him to conceive of historical dynamics to account for changes leading 
from  a  traditional  society  to  a  market  society.  “Polanyi  provides  us  with  an  account  of 
reciprocity and redistributive systems which is inherently changeless. There is nothing in his 
framework that explains changes in the mix of the system over time” (North 1977, p. 715). 
North‟s (1977) initial answer to Polanyi, which assumed that traditional societies were 
optimal in terms of transaction costs at a given time, remains unsatisfactory. It drew on the 
works of Williamson on the plurality of governance structures, dominated by the opposition 
between  market  and  non-market  structures,  without  providing  a  clear  explanation  of  the 
historical dynamics leading to the emergence of the market society. North reached a turning 
point in the early 1990s when he defined institutions as the framework of human interactions. 
This approach unveiled the ideological mistake of the conception of the market as a self-
regulated  mechanism,  independently  of  any  reference  to  institutions.  At  the  heart  of  the 
market, market transactions indeed suppose the existence of contracts and civil jurisdictions 
which guarantee their execution. 
North‟s contribution is thus not quite reducible to “new institutionalism”. He finds a 
way  out  of  the  dichotomy  between  market  and  non-market  implied  by  the  purality  of 
governance structures according to Williamson as well as by the social embeddedness of 
economic  activities  according  to  Granovetter.  North‟s  institutionalism  leads  him  to  posit 
economic dynamics through the complex interactions between a plurality of social dynamics, 
among which that of the institutional matrix is the most fundamental. Thus economic history 
is intimately linked to a history made of political revolutions and democratic transformations 
in which institutions continue their existence in the most ordinary daily life activities through 
the uses the actors make of them. 
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